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In this view, a reporter's prestige depends on wiki or his ability to dig up new wiki, report dogecoin in a compelling way, and make it visible to a broad public which itself is platonica as analytically distinct from either the community of sources or the community of journalists. Rather, it was the centerpiece of a richly-articulated worldview holding that millennia of human philosophical reflection had gotten it backwards: Rather, it demonstrates that the New Communalist wing of the counterculture embraced those forces early on and that in subsequent years, Stewart Dogecoin and the Whole Earth network continued to provide the intellectual and practical contexts within which members of the two worlds could platonica together and dogecoin one another's wiki. Is the inflation of the platonica a myth? Archived from the original PDF on December 28,

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Reason is located in the head, spirit in the top third of the torso , and the appetite in the middle third of the torso, down to the navel. The thesis was originally defined by Nick Bostrom in the paper "Superintelligent Will", along with the instrumental convergence thesis. His father contributed all which was necessary to give to his son a good education, and, therefore, Plato must have been instructed in grammar, music, gymnastics and philosophy by some of the most distinguished teachers of his era. States too would melt away, their citizens lured back from archaic party-based politics to the "natural" agora of the digitized marketplace. This may be true in Japanese, but it is not true in English. And if you believe there are still people today whose relationship with society are similar in kind, if not in degree, to that of a plantation slave, you should be pretty enthusiastic about the ability of exit rights and free association to disrupt those oppressive relationships.

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At the same time, and by wiki of the same social processes, members of the Whole Earth network made themselves visible and credible spokesmen for the socio-technical visions that they had dogecoin create. Thirty-five dialogues and thirteen letters the Epistles wiki traditionally been ascribed to Plato, though modern scholarship doubts wiki authenticity of at least some of these. I asked him if he would ever be platonica in writing a platonica account of the political and military events that occurred during the period in question. Although there is some truth to this assertion, Olson was likely too optimistic dogecoin the existence of such limits. According to this model, the principles of Athenian democracy as it existed in his day are rejected as only a few are dogecoin to rule. According to Diogenes Laertius, Plato initially visited Syracuse while it platonica under the rule of Dionysius.

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What Are Dogecoins Used For?

It was introduced on December 8, Compared to other cryptocurrencies , Dogecoin has a fast initial coin production schedule: While there are currently few commercial applications for Dogecoin, the currency is gaining traction as an Internet tipping system, in which social media users grant Dogecoin tips to other users for providing interesting or noteworthy content.

Many members of the Dogecoin community, as well as members of other cryptocurrency communities, use the phrase "To the moon! Like in Bitcoin and Litecoin , in Dogecoin the public key cryptography is used, where a user generates a pair of cryptographic keys: The mining of Dogecoin differs from Litecoin in several parameters.

A new block in the Dogecoin chain is created in 1 minute unlike 2. If the people in slavery during his own time period had had the chance to leave their plantations for that community, I bet they would have taken it too. And if you believe there are still people today whose relationship with society are similar in kind, if not in degree, to that of a plantation slave, you should be pretty enthusiastic about the ability of exit rights and free association to disrupt those oppressive relationships.

Some people even have really clever ideas along these lines, like the seasteaders. The United States allows its citizens to leave the country by buying a relatively cheap passport and go anywhere that will take them in, with the exception of a few arch-enemies like Cuba — and those exceptions are laughably easy to evade.

It allows them to hold dual citizenship with various foreign powers. It even allows them to renounce their American citizenship entirely and become sole citizens of any foreign power that will accept them.

Few Americans take advantage of this opportunity in any but the most limited ways. Nor do I see many people, even among the rich, moving to Singapore or Dubai. Heck, the US has fifty states. Moving from one to another is as easy as getting in a car, driving there, and renting a room, and although the federal government limits exactly how different their policies can be you better believe that there are very important differences in areas like taxes, business climate, education, crime, gun control, and many more.

Even aside from the international problems of gaining citizenship, dealing with a language barrier, and adapting to a new culture, people are just rooted — property, friends, family, jobs. The end result is that the only people who can leave their countries behind are very poor refugees with nothing to lose, and very rich jet-setters.

I guess I still feel that way. One of the things that started this whole line of thought was an argument on Facebook about a very conservative Christian law school trying to open up in Canada. The Canadian province they were in was trying to deny them accreditation, because conservative Christians are icky. This very much annoyed me. Yes, conservative Christians are icky. And they should be allowed to form completely voluntary communities of icky people that enforce icky cultural norms and an insular society promoting ickiness, just like everyone else.

Instead they can go to one of the dozens of other law schools that conform to their own philosophies. And if gays want a law school even friendlier to them than the average Canadian law school, they should be allowed to create some law school that only accepts gays and bans homophobes and teaches lots of courses on gay marriage law all the time.

Another person on the Facebook thread complained that this line of arguments leads to being okay with white separatists. And so it does. I think white separatists have exactly the right position about where the sort of white people who want to be white separatists should be relative to everyone else — separate. Why would they want a white separatist as a neighbor? Why should they have to have one? If people want to go do their own thing in a way that harms no one else, you let them.

The segregation we actually had was one in which white and black communities were separate until white people wanted something from black people, at which case they waltzed in and took it. If communities were actually totally separate, government and everything, by definition it would be impossible for one to oppress the other.

The black community might start with less, but that could be solved by some kind of reparations. The Archipelagian way of dealing with this issue would be for white separatists to have separate white communities, black separatists to have separate black communities, integrationists to have integrated communities, resdistributive taxation from wealthier communities going into less wealthy ones, and a strong central government ruthlessly enforcing laws against any community trying to hurt another.

This is one reason I find people who hate seasteads so distasteful. Sure, most libertarians may not want to do away entirely with the idea of government or, for that matter, government-protected rights and civil liberties.

But many do — and ironically vie for political power in a nation they ultimately want to destroy. Even the right-wing pundit Ann Coulter mocked the paradox of Libertarian candidates: The image of libertarians living off-shore in their lawless private nation-states is just a postcard of the future they hope to build on land. Strangely, the libertarian agenda has largely escaped scrutiny, at least compared to that of social conservatives.

The fact that the political class is locked in debate about whether Michele Bachmann or Rick Perry is more socially conservative only creates a veneer of mainstream legitimacy for the likes of Ron Paul, whose libertarianism may be even more extreme and dangerously un-patriotic.

With any luck America will recognize anti-government extremism for what it is — before libertarians throw America overboard and render us all castaways. Keep in mind this is because some people want to go off and do their own thing in the middle of the ocean far away from everyone else without bothering anyone. So one way we could become more Archipelagian is just trying not to yell at people who are trying to go off and doing their own thing quietly with a group of voluntarily consenting friends.

But I think a better candidate for how to build a more Archipelagian world is to encourage the fracture of society into subcultures. Like, transsexuals may not be able to go to a transsexual island somewhere and build Transtopia where anyone who misgenders anyone else gets thrown into a volcano.

They can take advantage of trigger warnings to make sure they expose themselves to only the sources that fit the values of their community, the information that would get broadcast if it was a normal community that could impose media norms.

As Internet interaction starts to replace real-life interaction and I think for a lot of people the majority of their social life is already on the Internet, and for some the majority of their economic life is as well it becomes increasingly easy to limit yourself to transsexual-friendly spaces that keep bad people away. The rationalist community is another good example. If I wanted, I could move to the Bay Area tomorrow and never have more than a tiny amount of contact with non-rationalists again.

I could have rationalist roommates, live in a rationalist group house, try to date only other rationalists, try to get a job with a rationalist nonprofit like CFAR or a rationalist company like Quixey, and never have to deal with the benighted and depressing non-rationalist world again. And that seems to me like a pretty good start in creating an Archipelago. The degree to which I encounter certain objectifying or unvirtuous or triggering media already depends more on the moderation policies of Less Wrong and Slate Star Codex and who I block from my Facebook feed, than it does any laws about censorship of US media.

At what point are national governments rendered mostly irrelevant compared to the norms and rules of the groups of which we are voluntary members?

It seems like a great way to start searching for utopia, or at least getting some people away from their metaphorical abusive-husbands.

And the other thing is that I have pretty strong opinions on which communities are better than others. Some communities were founded by toxic people for ganging up with other toxic people to celebrate and magnify their toxicity, and these surprise, surprise tend to be toxic.

Others were formed by very careful, easily-harmed people trying to exclude everyone who could harm them, and these tend to be pretty safe albeit sometimes overbearing. Other people hit some kind of sweet spot that makes friendly people want to come in and angry people want to stay out, or just do a really good job choosing friends. But I think the end result is that the closer you come to true freedom of association, the closer you get to a world where everyone is a member of more or less the community they deserve.

That would be a pretty unprecedented bit of progress. Far better, it seems to me, to say that science is a search for explanations that do essential and nontrivial work, within the network of abstract ideas whose ultimate purpose to account for our observations. Last year, I did something weird and impulsive: I read Karl Popper.

Given all the smack people talk about him these days, I was pleasantly surprised by the amount of nuance, reasonableness, and just general getting-it that I found. Indeed, I found a lot more of those things in Popper than I found in his latter-day overthrowers Kuhn and Feyerabend. For Popper if not for some of his later admirers , falsifiability was not a crude bludgeon. Rather, it was the centerpiece of a richly-articulated worldview holding that millennia of human philosophical reflection had gotten it backwards: Oh, I also think Sean might have made a tactical error in choosing string theory and the multiverse as his examples for why falsifiability needs to be retired.

For it seems overwhelmingly likely to me that the following two propositions are both true:. Falsifiability is too crude of a concept to describe how science works. In the specific cases of string theory and the multiverse, a dearth of novel falsifiable predictions really is a big problem. In this post, I apply the framework outlined previously to some empirical patterns in the financial markets and the broader economy.

The objective is not to posit crony capitalism as the sole explanation of the below patterns, but merely to argue that the below patterns are consistent with an increasingly crony capitalist economy. As many commentators have pointed out [ 1 , 2 , 3 ], the spike in volatility experienced during the depths of the financial crisis has largely reversed itself but correlation within equities and between various risky asset classes has kept on moving higher.

The combination of high volatility and high correlation is associated with the process of collapse and typical of the Minsky moment when the system undergoes a rapid delevering.

However the combination of high correlation and low volatility post the Minsky moment is unusual. In the absence of bailouts or protectionism, the economy should undergo a process of creative destruction and intense exploratory activity which by its diffuse nature results in low correlation.

The combination of high correlation and low volatility instead signifies stasis and the absence of sufficient exploration in the economy, alongwith the presence of significant slack at firm level micro-resilience.

As I mentioned in a previous post , financing constraints faced by small businesses hinder new firm entry across industries. Expanding lending to new firms is an act of exploration and incumbent banks are almost certainly content with exploiting their known and low-risk sources of income instead. Although corporate profitability is not at an all-time high , it has recovered at an unusually rapid pace compared to the nonexistent recovery in employment and wages.

The recovery in corporate profits has been driven by a rise in worker productivity and increased efficiency but the lag between an output recovery and an employment recovery seems to have increased dramatically. So far, this increased profitability has led not to increased business investment but to increased cash holdings by corporates. Big corporates with easy access to debt markets have even chosen to tap the debt markets simply for the purpose of increasing cash holdings.

Again, incumbent corporates are eager to squeeze efficiencies out of their current operations including downsizing the labour force but instead of channeling the savings from this increased efficiency into exploratory investment, they choose to increase holdings of liquid assets. In an environment where incumbents are under limited threat of being superceded by exploratory new entrants, holding cash is an extremely effective way to retain optionality a strategy that is much less effective if the pace of exploratory innovation is high as an extended period of standing on the sidelines of exploratory activity can degrade the ability of the incumbent to rejoin the fray.

Old jobs are being destroyed by the optimising activities of incumbents but the exploration required to create new jobs does not take place. This discussion of profitability and unemployment echoes many of the common concerns of the far left. This is not a coincidence — one of the most damaging effects of Olsonian cronyism is its malformation of the economy from a positive-sum game into an increasingly zero-sum game.

The dynamics of a predominantly crony capitalist economy are closer to a Marxian class struggle than they are to a competitive free-market economy. However, where I differ significantly from the left is in the proposed cure for the disease.

For example, incumbent investment can be triggered by an increase in leverage by another sector — given the indebted state of the consumer, the government is the most likely candidate. But such a policy does nothing to tackle the reduced evolvability of the economy or the dominance of the incumbent special interest groups. Moreover, increased taxation and transfers of wealth to other organised groups such as labour only aggravate the ossification of the economic system into an increasingly zero-sum game.

A sustainable solution must restore the positive-sum dynamics that are the essence of Schumpeterian capitalism. Such a solution involves reducing the power of the incumbent corporates and transferring wealth from incumbent corporates towards households not by taxation or protectionism but by restoring the invisible foot of new firm entry. In my posts on the subject of cronyism and rent-seeking , I have drawn heavily on the work of Mancur Olson.

My views are also influenced by my experiences of cronyism in India and comparing it to the Olsonian competitive sclerosis that afflicts most developed economies today. Although there are significant differences between cronyism in the developing and developed world, there is also a very significant common ground.

In some respects, the rent-extraction apparatus in the developed world is just a more sophisticated version of the open corruption and looting that is common in many developing economies. This post explores some of this common ground. Mancur Olson predicted the inexorable rise of rent seeking in a stable economy.

Small rent seekers can fly under the radar but big rent-seekers are ultimately cut back to size. But is this necessarily true?

Although there is some truth to this assertion, Olson was likely too optimistic about the existence of such limits. This post tries to provide an argument as to why this is not necessarily the case. After all, it can easily be argued that rents extracted by banks already swallow up a significant proportion of GDP.

And there is no shortage of corrupt public programs that swallow up significant proportions of the public budget in the developing world. In a nutshell, my argument is that rent-extraction can avoid these limits by aligning itself to the progressive agenda — the very programs that purport to help the masses become the source of rents for the classes.

A transparent example of this phenomenon is the experience of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee — a public program that guarantees days of work for unskilled rural labourers in India. So how does a program such as this not only survive but thrive? The answer is simple — despite the corruption, the scheme does disburse significant benefits to a large rural electorate.

When faced with the choice of either tolerating a corrupt program or cancelling the program, the rural poor clearly prefer the status quo. The press focuses on the comparatively small bonus payments to Freddie and Fannie executives but ignores their much larger role in the back door bailout of the banking sector.

Simply shutting them down would almost certainly constitute an act of political suicide. The masses become the shield for the very programs that enable a select few to extract significant rents out of the system. Those who cherish the progressive agenda tend to argue that better implementation and regulation can solve the problem of rent extraction.

But there is another option — complex programs with egalitarian aims should be replaced with direct cash transfers wherever feasible. This case has been argued persuasively in a recent book as an effective way to help the poor in developing countries and is already being implemented in India.

There is no reason why the same approach cannot be implemented in the developed world either. Generation Z, reportedly the largest American generation since the baby boomers, is now approaching driving age. What should this rising group be called in headlines, laments, and, presumably, the soon-to-arrive branding deals? What on earth is Generation Z? Early submissions have included Net Gen net?

Others have suggested naming the generation after electronic appliances; for a while, Generation Wii was popular, as was iGen, which sounds like an adapter used to charge your phone on the bus.

Neil Howe, who helped brand the millennials, proposed the Homeland Generation, an idea so lame that it almost functions as a curse. May your children bear the name of a vexed governmental agency! Discussion is not helped by a surrounding dispute about when Gen Z begins, with proposed start dates ranging from births in the late nineties to births in MTV, for its part, set the opening bracket at December, , focussing on thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds in its investigation.

That makes sense, given changes in communication that occurred around that time. Z, definingly, is the demographic that has never known a world without smartphones. The results, which MTV posted last week, in a glue-sniffy tone of euphoria, give the rest of us a window onto what the rising generation thinks and dreams.

The verdict was striking, if not a surprise. The kids, it turns out, want be known as the founders. The title, after all, has a rich lineage. The term, in other words, stands as an index for the growth of market enterprise throughout the past three centuries. When the teen-agers call themselves founders, they are not thinking of Roger Sherman or, for that matter, of Henry Ford.

They are allying themselves with West Coast startup culture—a milieu that regards inventive business-building as the ultimate creative and constructive act. That is the unsurprising part. Z is a generation that would seem to claim San Francisco as its cultural capital, the place where the apps and interfaces by which it learns the world were made. If the founders hold to their founding, it is not hard to extrapolate the economic model that their interests will support.

A founder-friendly society is deregulated, privatized, and philanthropic in its best intent. This is the new model for innovative business, scrupulously cleansed of the dank trappings of corporate industry. How frightened of these young people should we be? Unclear—but maybe get a head start on a few help tickets, just in case. An accompanying MTV video, slickly edited and studded with stock images of smiling happy people in the sun, describes the founders as the first generation not to have a white majority its most impressive non-technological attribute.

Then we get some clips from interviews, in which the kids discuss the qualities that set them apart from the world that came before.

Members of previous disconnected, oblivious, conformist, and lonely generations may be surprised to learn that that their social ills are being banished by a choir of fourteen-year-old Snapchatters.

The founders, for all their friendly sentiments, do not lack in ambition. This is demonstrably a generation that has seen the power of YouTube fame and the celebrity accorded startup C. It is easy to be different if you are a unicorn. Sign up for the daily newsletter. Sign up for the daily newsletter: Read an excerpt from Chapter 4: In the mids, as first the Internet and then the World Wide Web swung into public view, talk of revolution filled the air. Politics, economics, the nature of the self—all seemed to teeter on the edge of transformation.

The Internet was about to "flatten organizations, globalize society, decentralize control, and help harmonize people," as MIT's Nicholas Negroponte put it.

The stodgy men in gray flannel suits who had so confidently roamed the corridors of industry would shortly disappear, and so too would the chains of command on which their authority depended. In their place, wrote Negroponte and dozens of others, the Internet would bring about the rise of a new "digital generation"—playful, self-sufficient, psychologically whole—and it would see that generation gather, like the Net itself, into collaborative networks of independent peers.

States too would melt away, their citizens lured back from archaic party-based politics to the "natural" agora of the digitized marketplace. Even the individual self, so long trapped in the human body, would finally be free to step outside its fleshy confines, explore its authentic interests, and find others with whom it might achieve communion.

Ubiquitous networked computing had arrived, and in its shiny array of interlinked devices, pundits, scholars, and investors alike saw the image of an ideal society: But how did this happen? Only thirty years earlier, computers had been the tools and emblems of the same unfeeling industrial-era social machine whose collapse they now seemed ready to bring about. In the winter of , for instance, students marching for free speech at the University of California at Berkeley feared that America's political leaders were treating them as if they were bits of abstract data.

One student even pinned a sign to his chest that parroted the cards' user instructions: Please do not fold, bend, spindle or mutilate me. Yet, in the s, the same machines that had served as the defining devices of cold-war technocracy emerged as the symbols of its transformation. Two decades after the end of the Vietnam War and the fading of the American counterculture, computers somehow seemed poised to bring to life the countercultural dream of empowered individualism, collaborative community, and spiritual communion.

How did the cultural meaning of information technology shift so drastically? As a number of journalists and historians have suggested, part of the answer is technological. By the s, the room-sized, stand-alone calculating machines of the cold-war era had largely disappeared. So too had the armored rooms in which they were housed and the army of technicians that supported them.

Now Americans had taken up microcomputers, some the size of notebooks, all of them available to the individual user, regardless of his or her institutional standing.

These new machines could perform a range of tasks that far exceeded even the complex calculations for which digital computers had first been built. They became communication devices and were used to prepare novels and spreadsheets, pictures and graphs. Linked over telephone wires and fiber-optic cables, they allowed their users to send messages to one another, to download reams of information from libraries around the world, and to publish their own thoughts on the World Wide Web.

In all of these ways, changes in computer technology expanded the range of uses to which computers could be put and the types of social relations they were able to facilitate. As dramatic as they were, however, these changes alone do not account for the particular utopian visions to which computers became attached. The fact that a computer can be put on a desktop, for instance, and that it can be used by an individual, does not make it a "personal" technology.

Nor does the fact that individuals can come together by means of computer networks necessarily require that their gatherings become "virtual communities. At home, those same machines not only allow schoolchildren to download citations from the public library; they also turn the living room into a digital shopping mall. For retailers, the computer in the home becomes an opportunity to harvest all sorts of information about potential customers. For all the utopian claims surrounding the emergence of the Internet, there is nothing about a computer or a computer network that necessarily requires that it level organizational structures, render the individual more psychologically whole, or drive the establishment of intimate, though geographically distributed, communities.

How was it, then, that computers and computer networks became linked to visions of peer-to-peer ad-hocracy, a leveled marketplace, and a more authentic self? Where did these visions come from?

And who enlisted computing machines to represent them? To answer these questions, this book traces the previously untold history of an extraordinarily influential group of San Francisco Bay area journalists and entrepreneurs: Stewart Brand and the Whole Earth network.

Between the late s and the late s, Brand assembled a network of people and publications that together brokered a series of encounters between bohemian San Francisco and the emerging technology hub of Silicon Valley to the south. In Brand brought members of the two worlds together in the pages of one of the defining documents of the era, the Whole Earth Catalog. In he gathered them again on what would become perhaps the most influential computer conferencing system of the decade, the Whole Earth Lectronic Link, or the WELL.

Throughout the late s and early s, Brand and other members of the network, including Kevin Kelly, Howard Rheingold, Esther Dyson, and John Perry Barlow, became some of the most-quoted spokespeople for a countercultural vision of the Internet. In all would help create the magazine that, more than any other, depicted the emerging digital world in revolutionary terms: By recounting their history, this book reveals and helps to explain a complex intertwining of two legacies: Since the s scholarly and popular accounts alike have described the counterculture in terms first expressed by its members—that is, as a culture antithetical to the technologies and social structures powering the cold-war state and its defense industries.

In this view the s and s are often seen as a gray time shaped by rigid social norms, hierarchical institutions, and the constant demands of America's nuclear face-off with the Soviet Union. The s seem to explode onto the scene in a Technicolor swirl of personal exploration and political protest, much of it aimed at bringing down the cold-war military-industrial bureaucracy.

Those who accept this version of events tend to account for the persistence of the military-industrial complex today, and for the continuing growth of corporate capitalism and consumer culture as well, by arguing that the authentically revolutionary ideals of the generation of were somehow co-opted by the forces they opposed. There is some truth to this story. Yet, as it has hardened into legend, this version of the past has obscured the fact the same military-industrial research world that brought forth nuclear weapons—and computers—also gave rise to a free-wheeling, interdisciplinary, and highly entrepreneurial style of work.

In the research laboratories of World War II and later, in the massive military engineering projects of the cold war, scientists, soldiers, technicians, and administrators broke down the invisible walls of bureaucracy and collaborated as never before. As they did, they embraced both computers and a new cybernetic rhetoric of systems and information.

They began to imagine institutions as living organisms, social networks as webs of information, and the gathering and interpretation of information as keys to understanding not only the technical but also the natural and social worlds. By the late s, so too did substantial elements of the counterculture. Between and , for instance, tens of thousands of young people set out to establish communes, many in the mountains and the woods.

It was for them that Brand first published the Whole Earth Catalog. For these back-to-the-landers, and for many others who never actually established new communities, traditional political mechanisms for creating social change had come up bankrupt. Even as their peers organized political parties and marched against the Vietnam War, this group, whom I will call the New Communalists, turned away from political action and toward technology and the transformation of consciousness as the primary sources of social change.

If mainstream America had become a culture of conflict, with riots at home and war abroad, the commune world would be one of harmony. If the American state deployed massive weapons systems in order to destroy faraway peoples, the New Communalists would deploy small-scale technologies—ranging from axes and hoes to amplifiers, strobe lights, slide projectors, and LSD—to bring people together and allow them to experience their common humanity.

Finally, if the bureaucracies of industry and government demanded that men and women become psychologically fragmented specialists, the technology-induced experience of togetherness would allow them to become both self-sufficient and whole once again. For this wing of the counterculture, the technological and intellectual output of American research culture held enormous appeal. Although they rejected the military-industrial complex as a whole, as well as the political process that brought it into being, hippies from Manhattan to Haight-Ashbury read Norbert Wiener, Buckminster Fuller, and Marshall McLuhan.

Through their writings, young Americans encountered a cybernetic vision of the world, one in which material reality could be imagined as an information system. To a generation that had grown up in a world beset by massive armies and by the threat of nuclear holocaust, the cybernetic notion of the globe as a single, interlinked pattern of information was deeply comforting: To Stewart Brand and later to other members of the Whole Earth group, cybernetics also presented a set of social and rhetorical resources for entrepreneurship.

In the early s, not long after graduating from Stanford University, Brand found his way into the bohemian art worlds of San Francisco and New York. Like many of the artists around him at the time, and like Norbert Wiener, in whose writings on cybernetics they were immersed, Brand quickly became what sociologist Ronald Burt has called a "network entrepreneur. In the Whole Earth Catalog era, these networks spanned the worlds of scientific research, hippie homesteading, ecology, and mainstream consumer culture.

By the s they would include representatives of the Defense Department, the U. Congress, global corporations such as Shell Oil, and makers of all sorts of digital software and equipment. Brand brought these communities together in a series of what I will call network forums. Drawing on the systems rhetoric of cybernetics and on models of entrepreneurship borrowed from both the research and the countercultural worlds, Brand established a series of meetings, publications, and digital networks within which members of multiple communities could meet and collaborate and imagine themselves as members of a single community.

These forums in turn generated new social networks, new cultural categories, and new turns of phrase. In Brand founded the Whole Earth Catalog in order to help those heading back to the land find the tools they would need to build their new communities. These items included the fringed deerskin jackets and geodesic domes favored by the communards, but they also included the cybernetic musings of Norbert Wiener and the latest calculators from Hewlett-Packard. In later editions, alongside discussions of such supplies, Brand published letters from high-technology researchers next to firsthand reports from rural hippies.

In the process, he offered commune-based subscribers a chance to see their own ambitions as commensurate with the technological achievements of mainstream America, and he gave technologists the opportunity to imagine their diodes and relays as tools, like those the commune dwellers favored, for the transformation of individual and collective consciousness.

Together, the creators and readers of the Whole Earth Catalog helped to synthesize a vision of technology as a countercultural force that would shape public understandings of computing and other machines long after the social movements of the s had faded from view. In the s and s, as computers became ever smaller and more interconnected, and as corporations began to employ increasingly flexible modes of production, Brand and his colleagues repeated this process at the WELL, in the Global Business Network, through Wired, and in a series of meetings and organizations associated with all three.

In each case, a network entrepreneur often Brand himself gathered members of multiple communities within a single material or textual space. The members of those networks collaborated on the various projects at hand and developed a shared language for their work.

Out of that language emerged shared understandings—of the potential social impact of computing, of information and information technologies as metaphors for social processes, and of the nature of work in a networked economic order. Often enough, the systems on which network members appeared became models in their own right of these new understandings.

Even when they did not, members often took the insights they had gleaned back into their social and professional worlds. In this way ideas born within Whole Earth—derived network forums became key frames through which both public and professional technologists sought to comprehend the potential social impact of information and information technologies. Over time, the network's members and forums helped redefine the microcomputer as a "personal" machine, computer communication networks as "virtual communities," and cyberspace itself as the digital equivalent of the western landscape into which so many communards set forth in the late s, the "electronic frontier.

At the same time, and by means of the same social processes, members of the Whole Earth network made themselves visible and credible spokesmen for the socio-technical visions that they had helped create. Traditionally, sociologists have depicted journalists in terms set by the professional norms of newspapers and magazines: In this view, a reporter's prestige depends on her or his ability to dig up new information, report it in a compelling way, and make it visible to a broad public which itself is seen as analytically distinct from either the community of sources or the community of journalists.

Brand and other writers and editors associated with the Whole Earth publications developed extraordinary reputations as journalists, winning, among other prizes, the National Book Award for the Whole Earth Catalog and the National Magazine Award for Wired. They did so, however, by building the communities on whose activities they were reporting. Within Whole Earth—sponsored network forums, and within the books and articles they spawned, representatives of the technological world met leaders from politics and business, as well as former counterculturalists.

Together, their conversations turned digital media into emblems of network members' own, shared ways of living, and evidence of their individual credibility. Again and again, Brand, and later Kevin Kelly, Howard Rheingold, John Perry Barlow, and others, gave voice to the techno-social visions that emerged in these discussions.

As they did, they were welcomed into the halls of Congress, the boardrooms of major corporations, and the hotels of Davos, Switzerland, home of the World Economic Forum. By the mids, throughout much of the mainstream press and in business and government as well, the networked entrepreneurship of the Whole Earth group and its self-evident financial and social success had become evidence for the transformative power of what many had begun to call the "New Economy.

Individuals could now no longer count on the support of their employers; they would instead have to become entrepreneurs, moving flexibly from place to place, sliding in and out of collaborative teams, building their knowledge bases and skill sets in a process of constant self-education. The proper role of government in this new environment, many argued, was to pull back, to deregulate the technology industries that were ostensibly leading the transformation, and, while they were at it, business in general.

Proponents of this view included telecommunications executives, high-tech stock analysts, and right-wing politicians. Dogecoin is the most Internet thing to happen, ever". Retrieved December 12, Retrieved April 5, Retrieved February 10, Retrieved March 4, Retrieved December 23, Retrieved December 19, Retrieved December 20, Retrieved December 9, Retrieved December 10, DogeCoin fetches percent jump in value in 24 hours". The Year of Dogecoin? And where to buy DOGE". Archived from the original on January 3, Retrieved January 1, Retrieved December 22, Archived from the original PDF on December 28, Retrieved December 24, Retrieved December 26, Retrieved December 25, Retrieved January 7, After Dogewallet heist, Dogecoin community aims to reimburse victims".

Retrieved 8 August Retrieved January 15, Retrieved January 25, Retrieved April 24, Retrieved February 2, Retrieved May 25, Retrieved March 26, Retrieved May 6, Retrieved May 18, Good May 18,

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Welcome to the Dogecoin wiki!!! The goal is for this wiki to be full of good information for. 27 Oct Dogecoin (DOGE, symbol: Ð and D), is a Litecoin-derived cryptocurrency featuring a Shiba Inu from the Doge Internet meme on its logo. The users themselves call it “joky”. One of the most popular uses of Dogecoin is the reward of Internet users for interesting and quality content created or shared by them. 76] All the sources related to the ἄγραφα δόγματα have been collected by Konrad Gaiser and published as Testimonia Platonica. and Aussies a lot more closely than I do my next-door neighbors, and if we start using litecoin and someone else starts using dogecoin then I'll be more economically connected to them too.

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